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I. INTRODUCTION
Regulation of speech on the basis of the speech's message or viewpoint
is especially disfavored in the law.' The courts have generally concluded that
restricting speech based on anyone's disapproval of the viewpoint or message
of the speech "poses the greatest danger to liberty of expression. 2 Thus, it has
been said that "the most intense constitutional hostility is reserved for
measures that discriminate on the basis of viewpoint ....
This Article takes no issue with this principle as a general rule. The point
of the Article, however, is to illustrate the logic of what should be a crucial
exception to this general rule. This exception addresses regulation based on
message or viewpoint of what is commonly referred to as school-sponsored
speech. School-sponsored speech is speech by anyone that at least reasonably
appears to bear the approval or endorsement of public school authorities.'
Such school-sponsored speech, as in many school newspapers, websites,
displays, yearbooks, assemblies, or events, is common.
While precise counts are difficult, probably a majority of the courts5 and
commentators' who have addressed this important issue have wished to apply
something like the standard-and very demanding-strict scrutiny test to these
* Michael D. McCormick Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis. The author's
thanks go to Rachel Scherer for her consistently excellent assistance.
1. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("restrictions
based on viewpoint are... particularly pernicious"); Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512
U.S. 622, 685 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Rosenberger v. Rector
& Bd. of Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995) ("[v]iewpoint discrimination is... an egregious form
of content discrimination"). But cf. Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 633 n.l I
(2d Cir. 2005) (discussing the possibility of a school's viewpoint-based regulation prevailing even
under strict scrutiny).
2. Kent Greenawalt, VIEWPOINTS FROM OLYMPUS, 96 COLUM. L.REv. 697, 698. See also id. (referring
to "the Court's fundamental principle that, across a wide range of subject matters, viewpoint
discrimination is especially objectionable").
3. Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DUKE L.J. 589, 609-10 (1986).
4. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270-71 (1988).
5. See infra Section HI.
6. See id.
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viewpoint-based regulations of public school-sponsored speech.7 While this
approach is familiar and understandable, it is nonetheless a mistake, for
reasons discussed below.' The central problem, in its most concise terms, is
that strict judicial scrutiny of a school's viewpoint-based regulation of speech
that at least appears to be approved by the school administration typically
imposes unnecessary costs in basic social, educational, and cultural values,
including constitutional and indeed even free speech values.
To prepare this argument, Section II below presents the crucial and most
authoritative case of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier.9 Hazelwood is
widely thought to raise, without resolving, the question of the strict scrutiny,
if not outright, prohibition' ° of viewpoint-based restrictions on school-
sponsored speech. School-sponsored, or apparently school-approved, speech
is undertaken by a wide variety of factors, including students, classroom
teachers, other school employees, and even by outsiders such as school
visitors."' For the sake of simplicity, we will focus first, as Hazelwood itself
does, on the speech of students who under particular circumstances, such as in
the case of newspaper editors, might be thought to speak with the approval of
the school.'2 We will later expand our focus and think as well of teacher
speech that is arguably sponsored by the school.13
The argument proceeds, in Section III, through complex but unavoidable
issues of what is known as public forum doctrine, by itself and also in
combination with the original distinction between viewpoint-based and
viewpoint-neutral restrictions on speech. We will then begin to see some of
the surprising costs of strict scrutiny of viewpoint-based regulations and the
surprising benefits of a less stringent constitutional test.
Throughout, we will seek to distinguish school-sponsored speech from
the separate category of speech of and by school authorities, or official school
speech. 4 The distinction is important in the current law, but is often quite
difficult to draw in practice. We will also seek to distinguish school-sponsored
7. See id; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (for extended discussion in this connection).
8. See infra Sections I-V.
9. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
10. See infra, note 102 and accompanying text.
11. For a compilation and analysis of the use of the Hazelwood test, in place of other arguably appropriate
tests, to adjudicate cases involving the discipline of teachers for classroom speech, see Karen C. Daly,
Balancing Act: Teachers 'Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 1, 12(2001)
("Hazelwood's principles for limiting student expression cannot be imported into the realm of teacher
expression without excessively curtailing teachers' First Amendment rights"); Id at 16 ("[tlhe net
effect of Hazelwood as applied is the subtle infantilization of teachers").
12. As in Hazelwood itself, 484 U.S. at 271.
13. See Daly, supra note 11.
14. See infra notes 80, 129 and accompanying text.
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speech from speech by independent individual students or by independent
groups of students. 5 This is another distinction that is important to the current
law, but difficult to draw. Our focus will thus ideally be on school-sponsored
speech, rather than on either official school speech or on independent speech.
Section IV places the arguments developed to that point into our realistic
contemporary cultural and educational context. In that context, it becomes
clearer why a less demanding judicial test than strict scrutiny for viewpoint-
based regulations of school-sponsored speech promotes basic social,
educational, and cultural values, along with constitutional values including
freedom of speech. 6
Briefly put, a contemporary public school's viewpoint-based restrictions
on what others say with at least the apparent endorsement of the school are
realistically more likely to be well-justified than not. Given the basic values,
including free speech-related values, typically promoted routinely by most
contemporary public schools, we should be open to generally promoting those
values through viewpoint-based restrictions of speech that appear to bear the
school's approval.
There may admittedly be instances in which a contemporary public
school seeks to repress a clearly progressive statement made with its apparent
approval, but such instances should not fundamentally drive the relevant
general free speech rules. We should remember that speech by various parties
apparently in the name of the school can certainly send distracting or generally
harmful, community-damaging messages as well. We should also remember
that students and others remain relatively free to disseminate messages as long
as they do so clearly independently of the public school.
Section V, the Conclusion, briefly summarizes some of the most
important themes developed above. As well, Section V explores possible
limits to our argument against strict scrutiny for viewpoint-based regulation
by the school of apparently school-sponsored speech. Specifically, we briefly
consider the applicability of such a rule in the context of a major public
university restricting the speech of field-specialist professional faculty. As it
turns out, such cases can indeed raise important free speech issues. But they
will rarely qualify as Hazelwood-type "sponsorship" cases. Either the school
or the speaker in the university context can more easily disassociate itself from
the other party's sentiments, or can effectively disclaim any school-
sponsorship of the content of the speech in question. Such a disassociation, on
the part of either or both parties, can take place in ways that are public, clear
15. As, classically, in Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
16. See infra Sections IV and V.
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and unequivocal, conspicuous, and convincing to the relatively sophisticated
university audience most directly concerned.
Thus, the Hazelwood test, as interpreted here to allow for appropriate
viewpoint-based regulation of arguably school-sponsored speech, retains both
broad applicability and surprising appeal on the merits.
II. HAZEL WOOD AS SETTING THE STAGE FOR THE CURRENT
DEBATE ON VIEWPOINT-BASED REGULATION
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, involved a 6-3 decision, 7 with
the majority opinion being authored by Justice White,'8 and a dissenting
opinion for three relatively liberal justices 9 by Justice Drennan.2° As
formulated by Justice White, the case focused on "the extent to which
educators may exercise editorial control over the contents of a [public] high
school newspaper produced as part of the school's journalism curriculum."2'
The newspaper in question was written and edited under the auspices of
the high school's22 elective Journalism II class.23 Copies were distributed to
students and school personnel and to "members of the community."24 Of the
newspaper's annual printing expense, approximately one fourth was defrayed
by newspaper sales,25 and three fourths by the Hazelwood Board of
Education.26  The practice was apparently for the page proofs of each
newspaper issue to be submitted to the school principal for pre-publication
27review.
In Hazelwood, the principal had deleted two pages on various grounds
from an otherwise six page newspaper edition. One deleted story involved the
use of false names to preserve the anonymity of three pregnant students at the
school; with the principal fearing that the pregnant students might nonetheless
be identifiable from the story.E8 The principal also concluded that some
references in the story to sex and pregnancy were inappropriate for some of the
17. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kulmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 261 (1988).
18. Id. at 262.
19. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.
20. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun).
21. Id. at 262.
22. See id.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 262-63.
27. See id. at 263.
28. See id.
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youngest high school students. 29 As well, and also with respect to a separate
story, the principal was concerned about matters of privacy and journalistic
fairness. The principal was apparently under the impression that in a story
about the impact of divorce, a student making statements arguably critical of
her father was identified by name.3" The student's parents had apparently not
been given an opportunity to respond to or to consent to publication of the
student's comments.3'
The principal evidently believed that the stories could not be
appropriately edited if they were to be published before the end of the school
year, and that the only alternatives to running the unedited six page edition
were to publish no edition at all, or to delete the two pages containing the
stories in question, resulting in a four page newspaper. With the concurrence
of his superiors, the principal opted for the latter, four page edition
alternative,32 prompting the free speech claim in question.
The Supreme Court began its analysis in Hazelwood with the familiar, if
not particularly illuminating, observation that "[s]tudents in the public schools
do not 'shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at
the schoolhouse gate. '33 The Court then predictably cautioned that those
rights "'are not automatically coextensive with the rights of adults in other
settings '34 and "must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the
school environment. ' '35 Thus, "[a] school need not tolerate student speech that
is inconsistent with its 'basic educational mission."' 36 In a prior case, vulgarly
sexually explicit speech by a student addressing an official school assembly
could be sanctioned by a school in order to "dissociate itself'37 from the
speech. This form of disassociation was permitted as a clarifying
demonstration to observers "that such vulgarity is 'wholly inconsistent with
the fundamental values of public school education. "'38
The Court in Hazelwood then undertook an analysis of the school
newspaper in question under what is known as 'public forum' doctrine. 39 The
29. See id.
30. See id.
31. See id.
32. See id. at 264.
33. Id. at 266 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969)).
34. Id. (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 682 (1986)).
35. Id. (quoting Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506).
36. Id. (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 267 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 685-86).
39. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Cornelius v.
NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985); U.S. v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990); Ark.
Educ. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998).
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term 'public forum' itself is sometimes used equivocally. A public high
school's curricular newspaper, consisting in some measure of articles and
editorial contributions, if not letters to the editor from selected students, is
clearly a public forum of one type or another, as the term is broadly used."
The same newspaper, however, can also be classified as not being a public
forum in a narrower and more restrictive sense of the term.4
The latter, narrower sense, in which the curricular newspaper was not a
public forum, starts by distinguishing classic public fora such as public parks.
The Court in Hazelwood thus noted the availability for speech of classic
quintessential42 or traditional43 public fora such as public parks, public streets,
and public sidewalks." Speech in these classic fora can be regulated based on
the content of the speech at issue only if the regulation is narrowly tailored to
serve a genuinely compelling government interest. 45 Speech in classic fora can
also be regulated on content-neutral grounds if the regulation leaves open
ample alternative channels of communication and is reasonably well tailored
to serve a significant or substantial government interest.46
The Hazelwood Court then readily distinguished between public parks,
streets, and sidewalks on the one hand and a curricular school newspaper on
the other.47 The newspaper in question certainly had not served, "time out of
mind," ' as a forum for discussion as comprehensive in subject matter and
point of view as we might expect of a public park. Nor had the school
administration intentionally sought even recently to have the newspaper
occupy any such role.49
Complications began to arise, though, with the Court's recognition that
the school could also have created a public forum in the narrow sense by
allowing apparently "indiscriminate use"5 of the newspaper not by the public
in general, but even by a narrow segment of the public, such as a "class" of
40. The Court literally conceded as much in characterizing the newspaper as a "forum" reserved for its
largely curricular or more broadly pedagogical purposes. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
41. See id. at 267-70.
42. See, e.g., Hill v. Colo., 530 U.S. 703, 715 (2000); Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 196-97 (1992);
Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
43. See, e.g., Forbes, 523 U.S. at 677; Forsyth County, Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130
(1992); Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 796 (1989).
44. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267. For further discussion, see, e.g., Ward, 491 U.S. at 796-97; Frisby v.
Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988); Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
45. See the sources cited supra note 44.
46. See id.
47. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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students. 1 So a public forum in the narrow sense could be created and
reserved for members of a high school journalism class producing a newspaper
under the right circumstances.
In finding no public forum, the Court in Hazelwood appeared to rely,
then, not on the narrowness of the population allowed access to the newspaper,
but on the lack of authorization by the school for "indiscriminate use"52 of the
newspaper for speech purposes by anyone. Allowing only "limited
discourse"5 3 in a communicative medium such as a school newspaper does not
convert the medium into a public forum in the narrow sense.54
One potential problem, though, is that public fora in the narrow sense can
actually be compatible with stringent restrictions on what is to be said, as well
as on who can speak. It was well-established as of the time of Hazelwood that
"[a] public forum may be created for a limited purpose such as use by certain
groups ... or for the discussion of certain subjects."55  A forum such as a
school newspaper could in principle, therefore, exclude most interested
potential speakers and focus exclusively on one or a few subjects, to the
exclusion of all other subjects, and still count as a public forum in the narrow
sense.5
6
A narrow permissible range of subjects or speakers is not thought to
necessarily involve restricting speech on the basis of viewpoint. While it is
commonly said that viewpoint-based restrictions are either prohibited or at
least subjected to strict scrutiny in any public forum,57 it is also apparent that
governments may somehow define the scope, limits, and purposes of some
51. See id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. See id.
55. Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 (1983); See also Cornelius
v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985) (discussing the government interest
"in limiting the use of its property to its intended purpose"); Ark. Educ. Television Com'n v. Forbes,
523 U.S. 666, 677 (1998); (strict scrutiny applied where "the government excludes a speaker who
falls within the class to which a designated public forum is made generally available"); Rosenberger
v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533
U.S. 98, 106 (2001).
56. The Court has referred to the public forum classification as indicating general rather than selective
access for speakers. See Forbes, 523 U.S. at 679-80. But this terminology by itself is clearly an
oversimplification. The "general" availability need be only to a "certain class" of speakers, whereas
non-public forum status can attach to a forum used by a "particular class" of speakers who must
obtain permission as individuals to use the forum, presumably on either stringent or else on lax,
inclusive grounds. See id.
57. See, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07; Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806;
United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 730 (1990) (plurality opinion).
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public fora.58 Exclusion from the public forum can then be said to be not on
the basis of viewpoint, but on the basis that the speaker or subject is simply not
within the designated scope of the forum or not of a character relevantly
similar to those within the scope of the forum.59
In any event, the Hazelwood Court concluded that the curricular paper
in question did not qualify as a public forum in the narrow sense of the term.6"
Where a newspaper has been reserved not for indiscriminate open access, but
"for other intended purposes, 'communicative or otherwise,' then no public
forum has been created, and school officials may impose reasonable
restrictions on the speech of students, teachers, and other members of the
school community."61
At least in this passage the Hazelwood Court suggests, with whatever
degree of conscious consideration, that speech regulations in non-public fora
must be reasonable,62 with no explicit, additional requirement that such
regulation must also be viewpoint neutral.63 The primary authority the Court
cites, however, the Perry case, clearly does impose a viewpoint-neutrality
requirement for regulation of speech in non-public fora.64 We, of course, must
not read too much into this single passage or instance of omission.
But we should also notice that when the Hazelwood Court reiterates its
non-public forum finding, it again omits the usual viewpoint-neutrality
requirement,65 even while citing language in Perry that does impose such a
viewpoint-neutrality requirement.66 This omission inevitably forms some
portion of the backdrop against which to assess the Court's literal omission of
58. See, e.g., Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 730 (plurality opinion); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806; ACLU v. Mote,
423 F.3d 438, 444-45 (4th Cir. 2005).
59. See, e.g., GoodNews Club, 533 U.S. at 106-07; Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 829; Eichenlaub v. Twp.
of Ind., 385 F.3d 274, 280-81 (3d Cir. 2004); Mote, 423 F.3d at 444-45.
60. See Hazelwood Sch. District v. Kulmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988). For discussion by Judge Guido
Calabresi of the murkiness of the distinction between limited-purpose or type-2 fora and non-public
or type-3 fora, see Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 626-27 (2d Cir. 2005).
For a lucid but almost inevitably question-begging account of the three, or perhaps four, categories
under public forum doctrine, see Chiu v. Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260 F.3d 330, 334-50 (5th Cir.
2001) (per curiam).
61. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267 (quoting Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7).
62. See id.
63. See id
64. The Perry Court specifies that the speech regulation must be reasonable "and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." 460 U.S. at 46 (citing United
States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'n, 453 U.S. at 114,131 n.7). See also supra note 58 and
accompanying text.
65. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270 ("school officials were entitled to regulate the contents of the
[newspaper] in any reasonable manner") (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 46).
66. See id.
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a viewpoint-neutrality requirement when specifically addressing the curricular
newspaper as such.67 The Hazelwood Court then dotted the proverbial 'i' by
concluding that the newspaper in question had retained its curricular, non-
public forum status," and that regulation of speech in that venue was to be
tested essentially on the basis of reasonableness.69
The Court then, however, began a new and different section of the
analysis.7" The precise point of this separate section is not entirely clear. The
point may have been to merely address the reasonableness of the speech
regulation under (non)public forum doctrine. Alternatively, the point may
have been more broadly to go beyond (non)public forum doctrine, and to
distinguish on separate policy grounds the pro-speech rule applied in the
classic Tinker antiwar armband case.7'
If the Court is at this point adopting the first alternative and merely
applying in context the reasonableness inquiry already discussed,7 2 then the
Court's focus remains on forum analysis and on characterizing the curricular
newspaper as not a public forum.73 But we will then be left to wonder why the
Court then failed to consistently follow its own teaching, before and since, that
regulations of speech in even non-public fora must be not only reasonable but,
separately, must also be viewpoint neutral, or not based on viewpoint.74
Perhaps in this context, an intended omission of the usual viewpoint-neutrality
requirement for non-public fora can be justified, but if so, only on grounds the
Court has not fully articulated in Hazelwood.
After all, the Court cannot dismiss a viewpoint-neutrality requirement
merely on the grounds of the special characteristic, purposes, and distinctive
scope of the newspaper forum in question. The cases requiring viewpoint-
neutrality already recognize that non-public fora will have special purposes
67. Id. at 273 ("we hold that educators do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control
over the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as their
actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns").
68. See id. at 268, 269.
69. See id. at 269.
70. See id. Section B of the opinion at 270.
71. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
72. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 267, 270.
73. See id at 267-70.
74. See supra notes 40 & 47. See also, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Com'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. at 666, 682
(1998) ("the exclusion of a speaker from a nonpublic forum must not be based on the speaker's
viewpoint and must be otherwise reasonable in light of the purpose of the property"); Lamb's Chapel
v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-93 (1993) ("access to a nonpublic forum
can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable
in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral").
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that must be judicially respected.75 Therefore, something more must be said
if the Court is to understandably and persuasively renounce the usual
viewpoint-neutrality requirement in this context.
The Court at this point may, however, have instead been seeking more
ambitiously to transcend public forum doctrine by addressing the well-known
Tinker armband war protest case, which does not rely crucially on public
forum doctrine.76 Clearly enough, the Hazelwood opinion does explicitly
contrast the speech context and circumstances in Hazelwood with those in
Tinker. In particular, the Hazelwood Court emphasized the differences in the
attributability of the speech in each case to the school, along with the
differences in the speeches' effects on the carrying out of the school's
legitimate educational missions.77
The Hazelwood Court first formulated a distinction between speech that
the school is required merely to tolerate, and speech that the school is required
to affirmatively promote.78 Tinker requires schools to do no more than merely
tolerate independent and essentially personal student speech under specified
circumstances.79 The circumstances in Hazelwood would require something
more from, and would impact differently on, the school.80
The speech in Tinker, in the form of a black arm band protesting the
Vietnam War, could reasonably be ascribed to a student or to the student's
family, but not to the school itself. We do not reasonably assume that school
authorities know and approve of the political merits of whatever varying
messages independent students happen to bear on their clothing on any given
day. In an even clearer case, the school's tolerating both pro- and anti-
Vietnam War protests on the same day, would not lead a reasonable observer
75. See the cases cited supra notes 57, 64 & 74.
76. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509 (focusing on disruption or distraction and on the rights of the others, in
the context of the school's mission and functions, but without public forum analysis and forum
categorization in a formal, explicit way).
77. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270-71.
78. See id.
79. See id. The Court refers to Tinker-type speech as speech that merely "happens to occur on the school
premises." Id. This formula is misleading. It is true that the content of the speech in Tinker was not
particularly school-related, and could have reasonably been expressed in other venues. But an
individual student who wears a black arm band to school to protest the school's censorship policy is
clearly engaged in Tinker speech. And even the actual speech in Tinker took place in school
presumably because a school distinctively and conveniently aggregates one's peers. For cases
protecting student speech that the court recognizes could not reasonably be perceived as school-
sponsored or as endorsed by the school, see, e.g., Frederick v. Morse, 439 F.3d 1114, 1120-21 (9th
Cir. 2006); Burch v. Barker, 861 F.2d 1149, 1157 (9th Cir. 1988).
80. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271.
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to believe that the school officially had authoritatively endorsed both of the
opposing political views on the merits.
Student speech that appears in a curricular newspaper may, the Court
observed, be perceived differently. The speech in Hazelwood was to take
place in a school-sponsored forum,8' a forum that was actively supervised,
evaluated, ultimately controlled, and curricular in nature.82  A school-
sponsored or broadly curricular forum may well be such that "students,
parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive [it] to bear the
imprimatur of the school., 83 In Hazelwood, the newspaper was produced as
part of the Journalism II elective course under supervision and review by
faculty and administration for pedagogical purposes, was largely funded by the
Board of Education, and was distributed widely within the school and the
broad community.8'
On this basis, the Court concluded more broadly that
[e]ducators are entitled to exercise greater control over this [school-sponsored
or curricular] form of student expression to assure that participants learn
whatever lessons the activity is designed to teach, that readers or listeners are
not exposed to material that may be inappropriate for their level of maturity,
and that the views of the individual speaker are not erroneously attributed to
the school."5
These concerns encompass the problem of reasonable perceptions that the
school is endorsing, on the merits, the speech in question. 6 But the Court here
also recognizes, to some degree, a school's right to convey certain educational
lessons in ways that are not blurred or distorted or obscured by the speech of
others.87 And the Court also recognizes a problem of differing judgments over
student emotional maturity and emotional preparedness at varied ages for
particular materials.88
Each of these considerations may, in their place, be sound. But each to
one degree or another, and whetherjustifiably or not, inevitably opens the door
81. See id. at 271 & 271 n.3.
82. See id. at 271.
83. Id.
84. See id. at 262-63.
85. Id. at 271.
86. See supra text accompanying notes 83-85.
87. See supra text accompanying note 85.
88. See id It should be remembered that any student who disagrees with school administrators as to what
level of emotional maturity the student's colleagues have reached is welcome to address the students
on that more sophisticated and worldly basis, subject not to the Hazelwood standard, but to Tinker.
See, e.g., supra note 80.
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to sensible viewpoint-based restrictions on speech. We see this more clearly
as the Court continues:
A school must... retain the authority to refuse to sponsor student speech that
might reasonably be perceived to advocate drug or alcohol use, irresponsible
sex, or conduct otherwise inconsistent with the shared values of a civilized
order, or to associate the school with any position other than neutrality on
matters of political controversy. Otherwise, the schools would be unduly
constrained from fulfilling their role as a principal instrument in awakening
the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training,
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment.89
Inescapably, this logic authorizes speech regulations based on viewpoint, on
any reasonable understanding. This is not to minimize the line-drawing
difficulties among viewpoint-based, content-based, and content-neutral
restrictions.9" But distinctions among viewpoint-based, content-based, and
content-neutral restrictions are central to free speech law as it is currently
envisioned.9' The Hazelwood Court's language here certainly seems to
legitimize some instances of viewpoint-based restrictions of school-sponsored
speech.
Schools seem to be authorized by the Court's language to refuse, if they
are thus inclined, to sponsor speech that endorses what is thought to be
irresponsible sex, or to even appear to sponsor such speech. Presumably,
schools may still sponsor, as well as directly engage in, speech that
disapproves of what is thought to be irresponsible sex. Unavoidably, this
option to refuse to sponsor certain objectionable or mission-impairing
messages clearly opens the door to viewpoint-based restrictions.
It is admittedly technically possible for public schools to refuse to sponsor
allegedly irresponsible sexual speech while sponsoring responsible such
speech, where the restriction of the first sort is in some sense not based on
content or the viewpoint taken by the speech in question. Thus, school
sponsorship could be denied to, say, sexually permissive speech, but
supposedly not based on any viewpoint attributable to such speech. The
89. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (quotations and citations omitted).
90. For a sense of some of the difficulties involved, see R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-
Neutral Regulation of Speech: The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 333
(2006). See also Make the Road By Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 150 (2d Cir. 2004) ("the
distinction between content discrimination-permissible in a nonpublic forum-and viewpoint
discrimination-impermissible-is somewhat imprecise"); Peck v. Baldwinsville Central School Dist.,
426 F.3d 617, 630 (2d Cir. 2005) ("a problematic endeavor").
91. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality As a Central Problem of Freedom of Speech: Problems
in the Supreme Court's Application, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 49, 53 (2000).
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argument, under the current case law, would have to be that the restriction on
speech was instead justified by reference to what is called the secondary
effects of the speech. Secondary effects of speech could include various sorts
of ordinary police power harms, not themselves distinctly speech related, and
not generally mediated by anyone's agreeing or disagreeing with the content
or viewpoint of the regulated speech, that are yet somehow sufficiently
associated with the speech in question.
Thus, the Court in City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres92 looked to
supposed secondary effects of the sexually-themed cinema, including various
sorts of disorderliness and mostly petty crimes and other adverse neighborhood
effects, in classifying the zoning regulation that focused on adult theatres as
in substance merely a content-neutral speech restriction.9
So in some cases, it might be technically possible for a school to target,
say, apparently school-sponsored sexually irresponsible speech without doing
so on the basis of the disfavored point of view of the speech. But realistically,
the proffered justification in such cases is more likely to be viewpoint-based.
A justification for a restriction of speech that involves causal mediation of any
harm through anyone being relevantly influenced by the point of view
underlying the speech will typically amount to a viewpoint-based restriction.94
For example, refusing to sponsor sexual speech for fear that some students will
learn what the school takes to be destructive lessons, apparently with the
endorsement of the school, will normally be mediated by the students'
adoption of, or direct influence by, the sexual message. In this crucial sense,
the speech restriction will be plainly viewpoint-based.
More broadly, a public school's refusal to sponsor speech it deems
incompatible with the shared values of a civilized social order95 will typically
be mediated by someone's possible acceptance or rejection of the viewpoint
92. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
93. See id. at 47-49. Whether the Court in Renton actually thought the regulation in question to be
content-neutral or merely chose to treat it as such has been the subject of some dispute. See, e.g., City
of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, 535 U.S. 425, 448 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the
judgment) (the apparent content-neutral classification as "something of a fiction"); Id. at 457 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (the Renton speech regulation as in a limbo realm of "content-correlation"); Joelner
v. Viii. of Washington Park, 378 F.3d 613, 622 (7t h Cir. 2004).
94. Thus there will commonly be a distinction between regulating even detestable speech (merely)
because it wakes up sleeping people, and regulating detestable speech out of fear that some persons
will accept and believe the detestable speech, leading to various (further) harms.
95. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986)).
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of the speech in question, and will therefore be viewpoint-based regulation,
reflecting approval of or hostility toward one or more points of view.96
On this basis, Hazelwood in general, clearly allows for a school's control
over its own official speech.97 More interestingly, schools would then also
seem to have some latitude in controlling, even with an eye toward viewpoint,
speech the school might reasonably be thought to otherwise endorse. The
school's range of discretion regarding both its own clearly official
institutionalized messages and speech by others that the school merely appears
to sponsor is thought to reflect the basic mission and purposes of public
schools. These essential public school functions are thought to include
pedagogical and broadly educational goals, training and socialization, and
broad acculturation.9"
The Court in Hazelwood then brought the broadly analytical, test-
formulating, and standard-setting portion of the opinion to a close by again
distinguishing Tinker-type independent student speech from cases in which the
school is asked to in effect "lend its name and resources99 to student
expression. 100 The extent to which non-public forum doctrine was being relied
upon, modified, or limited was left unclear.
The Court's summary holding, on whatever theory, makes no explicit
reference to any requirement, of any stringency, that the Hazelwood-type
restriction on speech be viewpoint-neutral. In this, the Court's summary
holding parallels the Court's previous omission of any explicit viewpoint-
neutrality requirement in holding the curricular newspaper to not constitute a
public forum."'
Instead, the Court in language we shall next see to have given rise to sharp
controversy, confusion, and division in the courts and circuits," 2 adopted what
96. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976) (plurality opinion) (concern for
whether the regulation was motivated by "hostility for the point of view" of the targeted speakers);
Ridley v. Massachusetts Bay Trans. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 82 (1st Cir. 2004) (viewpoint-based
restriction as a matter crucially of authoritative preference among viewpoints); McGuire v. Reilly,
386 F.3d 45, 62 (1st Cir. 2004) ("[t]he essence of a viewpoint discrimination claim is that the
government has preferred the message of one speaker over another").
97. For the government's latitude on even viewpoint-based grounds when speaking in its own official
voice and capacity, see, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 833 (1995);
Wells v. City and County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001); Downs v. Los Angeles
Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[a]n arm of local government ... may
decide not only to talk about gay and lesbian awareness and tolerance in general, but also to advocate
such tolerance if it so decides, and restrict the contrary speech of one of its representatives").
98. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272 (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
99. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272.
100. Id. at 272-73.
101. See supra notes 61-69 and accompanying text.
102. See infra Section L.
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appears to be a variant of a minimum scrutiny" 3 test: "we hold that educators
do not offend the First Amendment by exercising editorial control over the
style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities
so long as their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
concerns." 1" Omission again here of any explicit viewpoint neutrality
requirement has become the focal point of controversy.
III. DOES HAZEL WOOD PERMIT VIEWPOINT-BASED
RESTRICTIONS ON SCHOOL-SPONSORED STUDENT SPEECH?
A. The Dispute Among the Courts
The Hazelwood case itself does not explicitly require that the schools'
restrictions of apparently school-sponsored speech be viewpoint-neutral, even
though Hazelwood seems to rely on cases that do recognize such a
requirement.) ° Nor does Hazelwood, at least in the context of discussing
public forum doctrine, articulate and defend such a loosening of the
constitutional tests applied to non-public fora. °6 Whether the Court's later
distinguishing of Tinker-type genuinely independent student speech carries the
argument further is a separate matter.
Thus, the courts have understandably divided on this crucial point in their
interpretation of Hazelwood. A few courts have taken Hazelwood at its word
and have allowed for the possibility of viewpoint-based regulation of
apparently school-sponsored speech. Notably, the First Circuit"0 7 and the
103. For a classic formulation of a similar minimum scrutiny test in the area of constitutional equal
protection, see, e.g., Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 632 (1996) (Colorado state constitutional
amendment "lacks a rational relationship to legitimate state interests"); Id. at 635 (citing Kadrmas v.
Dickinson Pub. Sch., 487 U.S. 450, 462 (1988)).
104. Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. We may assume that this formula's reference to legitimate
"pedagogical" concerns, as opposed to leaving the nature of the school's legitimate concerns
unspecified, was not intended to further limit the scope of a school's legitimate concerns beyond
those already implied by the Court's discussion. See supra notes 69 & 73, together with notes 86 &
90, and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270 (citing Perry, 460 U.S. at 47); Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 287
(citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985)) ("[c]ontrol over
access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject matter and speaker identity so long as the
distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint
neutral") (rejecting viewpoint suppression).
106. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 270.
107. See, e.g., Ward v. Hickey, 996 F.2d 448, 452-54 (1st Cir. 1993).
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Tenth Circuit,' 8 with occasional support from scattered additional courts109
and judges,' have taken such a course.1 ' Arguably a greater number of
courts and commentators," 12 however, have read Hazelwood as applying the
viewpoint neutrality requirement for nonpublic fora in general, even in the
context of apparently school-sponsored speech. This approach, therefore has
held such viewpoint-based restrictions subject to rigorous scrutiny. Among
108. See, e.g, Fleming v. Jefferson County Sch. Dist. R-I, 298 F.3d 918, 926-28 (10th Cir. 2002).
109. See, e.g., Chiras v. Miller, No. 3:03-CV-2651-M, 2004 WL 1660388, at *11 (N.D. Tex. Jul. 23,
2004) ("[tlhe Supreme Court's reasoning in Hazelwood suggests that the Supreme Court intended that
educators have the discretion to make viewpoint-based determinations") aff'don other grounds, 432
F.3d 606, 615 n.27 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[b]ecause we conclude that Hazelwood does not apply in this
case, we do not consider whether Hazelwood requires viewpoint neutrality").
110. See, e.g., C.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167, 172 (3d Cir. 1999) (Stapleton, J., for the court) ("a viewpoint-
based restriction on student speech in the classroom may be reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns and thus permissible"), vacated and remanded in part and aff'd by equally
divided vote, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); C.H. v. Olivia, 226 F.3d 198, 210-11 & 210 n.4
(3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J., dissenting). See also Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d
1208, 1217 (11 th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (Black, J., specially concurring) ("Hazelwood... allows
for viewpoint-based discrimination against school-sponsored student expression"); Id. at 1217-20.
111. This is not to suggest that all judicial approaches to Hazelwood on the question of viewpoint-based
regulation fall into a neat binary opposition.
112. See, e.g., Lisa Shaw Roy, Inculcation, Bias, and Viewpoint Discrimination in Public Schools, 32
PEPP. L. REV. 647, 668 (2005) ("in cases in which Hazelwood is appropriate, courts should
nonetheless ensure that the reasons given by school officials for restrictions on speech are not 'sham'
reasons concealing a desire to suppress a political, religious, or racial viewpoint"); Samuel P. Jordan,
Viewpoint Restrictions and School-Sponsored Student Speech: Avenues For Heightened Protection,
70 U. Ci. L. REv. 1555, 1556 (2003) ("[i]f a constitutional exception permitting restrictions on
student points of view is not compelled by Hazelwood, it is at least arguably consistent with a fair
reading of the decision. Nevertheless, such an exception threatens the First Amendment rights of
students . . . and is inconsistent with fundamental educational principles. Although it may be
appropriate for school officials to prefer a particular viewpoint, and even to advocate it, they should
not be permitted to advance that viewpoint simply by suppressing all others"); Martin H. Redish &
Kevin Finnerty, What Did You Learn In School Today? Free Speech, Values Inculcation, and the
Democratic-Educational Paradox, 88 CORNELL L. REv. 62, 108 (2002) ("our model would clearly
prohibit schools from ... promoting the value of tolerance, or warning of the dangers of drugs or
tobacco except within the confines of a clearly [and narrowly] defined course curriculum, and even
then only if such efforts are substantially related to the course's broader perspective, apart from the
goals of inculcation"). But cf. Janna J. Annest, Note Only the News That's Fit to Print: The Effect
ofHazelwoodon the FirstAmendment Viewpoint-Neutrality Requirement in Public School-Sponsored
Forums, 77 WASH. L. REv. 1227, 1228 (2002) (judicial deference to local authorities and traditional
functions of school administrators).
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these courts are the Second Circuit," 3 the Ninth Circuit," 4 the Eleventh
Circuit," 5 and the Sixth Circuit in dicta," 16 along with otherjudges."
7
The courts are deeply divided on how to crucially interpret Hazelwood.
Arguably, the preponderance of the case authority lies with requiring"'
113. See, e.g, Peck v. Baldwinsville Cent. Sch. Dist., 426 F.3d 617, 633 (2d Cir. 2005) (Calabresi, J., for
the court) ("we conclude that a manifestly viewpoint discriminatory restriction on school-sponsored
speech is, prima facie, unconstitutional, even if reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical
interests") (emphasis in the original). See also id. at 632 ("we are reluctant to conclude that the
Supreme Court would, without discussion and indeed totally sub silentio, overrule Cornelius and
Perry -even in the limited context of school-sponsored student speech").
114. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829 (9th Cir. 1991) (en banc);
Downs v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1010-11 (9th Cir. 2000) (noting the
Planned Parenthood result, supra, in dicta). See also, at the trial court level within the Ninth Circuit,
Seidman v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 327 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1108-09 (D. Ariz. 2004)
(school-sponsored speech, or speech bearing school imprimatur, but not speech by school itself, as
subject to viewpoint-neutrality analysis).
115. See, e.g., Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314,1319 n.7, 1325 (11 th Cir. 1989). See also Bannon v. Sch.
Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1215 (11 th Cir. 2004) ("Hazelwood does not allow a
school to censor school-sponsored speech based on viewpoint"); Id. ("[a] Ithough Hazelwood provides
reasons for allowing a school official to discriminate based on content, we do not believe it offers any
justification for allowing educators to discriminate based on viewpoint") (quoting Searcey, 888 F.2d
at 1325 (emphasis in the original)). But see id. at 1217, 1217 (Black, J., concurring specially)
(Hazelwood as permitting "viewpoint-based discrimination against school-sponsored student
expression").
116. See Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 355 (6th Cir. 2001) (dicta) ("[e]ven were we to assume... that
the yearbook was a nonpublic forum, confiscation of the yearbook would still violate.., free speech
.... Although the government may act to preserve a nonpublic forum for its intended purposes, its
regulation of speech must nonetheless be reasonable, and it must not attempt to suppress expression
based on the speaker's viewpoint"). See also within the Sixth Circuit at the trial court level, Dean v.
Utica Cmty. Sch., 345 F. Supp. 2d 799, 806 (E.D. Mich. 2004) (requiring viewpoint neutrality under
Hazelwood in reliance on Kincaid, supra); Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schools, 293 F. Supp. 2d 780,
793, 797 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (same). For commentary on Dean, see Rodney A. Smolla, Smolla &
Nimmer On Freedom of Speech 17:10.50 (Vol. 2) (Apr. 2005).
117. Significantly, then judge and now Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito has argued in the context of
religiously expressive speech in a public school class assignment that "even in a 'closed' forum
governmental 'viewpoint discrimination' must satisfy strict scrutiny." C.H. v. Oliva, 226 F.3d 198,
203, 210 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (Alito & Mansmann, JJ., dissenting). The en banc opinion in Oliva
vacated and remanded in part a panel opinion reported at 195 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 1999), in which the
panel had concluded that "a viewpoint-based restriction on student speech in the classroom may be
reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns and thus permissible." Oliva, 195 F.3d at 172.
The en banc vacating opinion itself, apart from the Alito dissent, did not reach and discuss the issue
of the permissibility of viewpoint-based restrictions under Hazelwood. See Oliva, 226 F.3d at 203.
At least vaguely relevant for dicta would be the school subsidy of speech case of Bd. of Regents v.
Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000).
118. While courts occasionally refer literally to a constitutional prohibition of viewpoint-based restrictions,
they presumably mean only that such restrictions are strongly disfavored and are subject to strict
scrutiny. See, e.g., Peck, 426 F.3d at 633, n.1 1; Oliva, 226 F.3d at 210, n.4 (Alito, J., dissenting)
(citing authorities on per se unconstitutionality of viewpoint-based restrictions versus a prima facie
unconstitutionality tested by strict scrutiny). Cf Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 212 (1992)
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viewpoint neutrality in regulating school-sponsored speech. But we should be
able to do better than just mechanically total up the number of cases and
announce a result. We should also be able to do better than offering merely
a narrow attempt to interpret Hazelwoods failure to discuss a possible
viewpoint-neutrality requirement"' against a background of its references to
cases imposing just such a requirement.2
B. The Basic Meaning of Allowing or Disallowing Viewpoint-Based
Regulations Under Hazelwood
How, then, should the courts resolve what is left debatable in Hazelwood?
On the merits, should viewpoint-based restrictions on school-sponsored
student speech be prohibited or more precisely, subjected to some version of
strict scrutiny? Strict scrutiny, after all, is not an utterly unaccommodating
standard. Strict in theory need not mean fatal in fact.12' Under a strict scrutiny
test, restrictions on school-sponsored speech could survive if shown to be
narrowly tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 122
Literally, a test that combines the express language in Hazelwood with a
viewpoint-neutrality requirement would not in itself look like a strict scrutiny
test. The test would draw from the familiar tests for non-public fora in
general, 23 but would have three explicit parts. A school's restriction of
apparently school-sponsored speech would thus have to promote a legitimate
pedagogical concern, 124 the restriction on student speech would have to be
(Kennedy, J., concurring).
This interpretation does mean, however, that the government interest underlying such restrictions
must be of the same weight as that required in cases of subject matter-based restrictions in other types
of fora. The required degree of tailoring between the government interest and the scope of the speech
restriction varies according to forum. See, e.g., the sources cited supra note 44. But viewpoint-based
restrictions in school-sponsored speech cases, as in non-public fora generally, and even subject matter
based restrictions on speech in other fora, would require a showing of a compelling government
interest. See, e.g., the sources cited supra note 44.
119. See, e.g., the discussion in Peck, 426 F.3d at 632-33. The Court in Hazelwood also does not
explicitly characterize the principal's justifications for deleting the two stories in question as content-
neutral.
120. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
121. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995), as later validated in Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Id. at 326-27 ("[a]lthough all governmental uses of race are
subject to strict scrutiny, not all are invalidated by it").
122. For the standard strict scrutiny test, see, e.g., Perry, 460 U.S. at 45.
123. See, e.g, the sources cited supra note 105.
124. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
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reasonably related to that concern, and the restriction would have to be
viewpoint-neutral as well. 125
This understanding of a Hazelwood test would be, in two respects, looser
than a standard strict scrutiny test. A merely legitimate, as opposed to
genuinely compelling, interest would be required. That the interest would
have to be pedagogical, 126 rather 'than encompassing just any governmental
interest, does not seem especially restrictive, given the breadth of a school's
possible interests discussed in Hazelwood. 27  Moreover, the test would
literally and directly apply only a reasonable relationship test 28 to the degree
of fit between regulatory ends and means, as opposed to the more demanding
narrow tailoring required under conventional strict scrutiny.'29
The test above would also impose a third element of viewpoint neutrality.
Admittedly, it seems unlikely that this would be read as an absolute
prohibition of any viewpoint-based regulation of school-sponsored speech in
all circumstances. 31 If a school were to impose such a viewpoint-based
restriction, presumably most courts would be willing to consider the weight of
the school's interest and the degree of tailoring involved, and apply some
awkwardly superimposed form of strict scrutiny. If the school's interest in
applying a viewpoint-based regulation were deemed not just legitimate but
sufficiently compelling, and the degree of tailoring sufficiently precise, such
a regulation could in a presumably rare case survive;'3' or so we may assume
for present purposes. The question is instead whether upholding viewpoint-
based regulations of school-sponsored speech at most in only rare instances is
the most defensible judicial course.
C. Hazelwood, Viewpoint-Based Regulation, and Public Forum Doctrine
We may reformulate the above question in a number of ways. One such
way is to ask whether a version of strict scrutiny should be applied to
125. This is presumably the thrust of the cases cited supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
126. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
127. See id at 271-72 (quoting Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683) (discussing interests ranging from discouraging
poor grammar or drug and alcohol use to inculcating "the shared values of a civilized social order")
128. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 656 (1995) (random urinalysis tests for public
school athletes under the search and seizure clause) (citing Hazelwood as requiring only
reasonableness of relationship).
129. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 326 (2003); Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'
Ass'n, 460 U.S. 45 (1983); Riley v. Nat'l. Fed. of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 800-01 (1988) (strict
scrutiny and narrow tailoring in particular required of regulation of charitable funding solicitation).
130. See, e.g., the sources cited supra note 118.
131. See id
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viewpoint-based regulations of school-sponsored speech in nonpublic fora.
This formulation reminds us of the role of public forum doctrine, and more
specifically of the law's general hostility toward viewpoint-based regulations
even in nonpublic fora. 132
Thinking of Hazelwood-type school-sponsored speech cases as problems
within public forum doctrine is in some ways confining, but in other ways
illuminating. Hazelwood-type cases, whether involving viewpoint-based
restrictions or not, involve an arguably very special and distinct kind of
nonpublic forum. If we treat Hazelwood cases as merely a typical species of
nonpublic forum case, we are thereby led to focus unhelpfully on the broad
rules that govern nonpublic fora and other types of fora generally, whatever
the significant differences in more specific institutional context and purposes.
This awkward focus on forum classification is of especially great practical
importance in light of the frequent and severe difficulties courts have in
classifying a particular forum as a type-3 nonpublic forum or as instead a type-
2 designated or limited purpose public forum. 13   Disputes within a multi-
member court over how a given forum should be classified are common. 134 In
fact, such disputes are nearly guaranteed by the inexactitude, 135 if not
132. See, e.g, Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106-07 (2001);
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985).
133. See, e.g., the thinness of the distinctions drawn in Ark. Educ. Television Sys. v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666,
679 (1998) ("a designated public forum is not created when the government allows selective access
for individual speakers rather than general access for a class of speakers"). See also id.
(distinguishing "property generally available to a certain class of speakers" from property where
access is reserved "to a particular class of speakers, whose members must then, as individuals, 'obtain
permission') (citing Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 804).
One way of seeing the problem with this distinction is that selective access for a particular class of
individual speakers could in a given case mean that any of an enormous number and broad variety
of speakers need merely show a student identification card to be admitted to the non-public forum.
Non-public or type-3 fora can thus be broadly inclusive and nearly non-selective. Designated or type-
2 fora, however, can in contrast be starkly limited to a narrow and distinctive "certain" class of the
few speakers interested, say, in the narrow subject of the upcoming re-election campaign of a
powerful local politician. The first forum would be nearly wide open, but classified as a nonpublic
or type-3 forum; the second forum's constricted focus and membership would still leave it a
designated or type-2 forum.
The creators of fora rarely think systematically of the various bounds and limits of forum access, and
access policies commonly evolve only ad hoc. Reasonable disputes over whether a forum is a type-2
designated forum or else a type-3 non-public forum are thus inevitable. Even in Forbes itself, the
majority held the televised debate to be a non-public forum. Id. at 678. The three dissenters,
however, observed with equal logic that if the forum owner invited, as a class, the class of viable or
newsworthy electoral candidates, the government had on the majority's own definition clearly created
a designated public forum. See id. at 683, 693 n. 18 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. See supra note 133; Peck, 426 F.3d at 626-27 (2d Cir. 2005); Chiu v. Piano Indep. Sch. Dist., 260
F.3d 330, 344-50 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
135. See supra notes 133-34.
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manipulability, of how the respective fora can often be characterized, limited,
and defined.'36
With these murky distinctions among types of fora and different resulting
constitutional tests, it is important to think carefully about any given forum
classification. However, given the uncertain definitional boundaries among
the kinds of fora, it is especially helpful to consider the consequences of
schools' and courts' inevitable misclassifying school-sponsored speech among
the various kinds of fora.
If mistakes in forum classification are indeed common, we should take the
likely effects of those erroneous classifications into proper account. To begin
with, we should recognize that in some cases, a court may classify a
viewpoint-based restriction of school-sponsored speech as taking place not
within a type-3 nonpublic forum, but within a type-2 designated or limited
purpose public forum. 37 A viewpoint-based restriction in a Hazelwood non-
public forum might not face strict scrutiny, depending upon whether we
ultimately decide that a viewpoint-neutrality requirement in Hazelwood cases
is appropriate. Yet if we mistakenly think the speech is taking place in a type-
2 designated or limited purpose public forum, the viewpoint-based speech
restriction will uncontroversially be subject to strict scrutiny and quite likely
struck down, as would a restriction that is more generally content-based. 38
In such a mistaken forum classification, there is actually a chance that the
speech regulation will not face strict scrutiny. This is largely not a matter of
principle, but rather, of a further murky and manipulable distinction. In a
type-2 designated or limited purpose public forum, what might otherwise be
thought of as a fatally viewpoint-based restriction on speech may be sanitized
and excused if the "viewpoint" can instead be described as part of the unstated
definition, scope, and limits of the forum. '31 What would otherwise amount
136. See id.
137. Our emphasis at this point is not on confusion between viewpoint-based and any other sorts of
restrictions on speech, but on confusions between types of fora, as introduced supra notes 133-34.
138. See, e.g., Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 46 (1983) (as long as a government
chooses to hold open a designated or limited purpose public forum, "it is bound by the same standards
as apply in a traditional public forum. Reasonable [content-neutral] time, place and manner
regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be narrowly drawn to effectuate a
compelling state interest") (quoting Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269-70 (1981)).
139. See, e.g., Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 252-54 (4th Cir. 2003); Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of
Cookeville, Tenn., 221 F.3d 834, 842 n.5 (6th Cir. 2000) (strict scrutiny for regulation of speakers
assumed to fall within the scope of the forum, but not for those assumed to fall outside the intended
scope and limits of the designated forum) (citing Warren v. Fairfax County, 196 F.3d 186, 193-94
(4th Cir. 1999) (en banc)).
The key to excluding a speaker from a designated or limited-purpose forum is an obviously vague
inquiry into whether the excluded party is of a relevantly "similar character" with those included. See
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to a viewpoint can legitimately be built into the very scope or theme of a given
type-2 forum. Contrary speech in such a case could then be held to be
relevantly dissimilar, thus outside the defined scope and limits of the forum,
and therefore properly excludable as foreign to the forum."' 0 In such a case,
the court may or may not still reach the right result. But any fortuitously right
result in such a case would still reflect misclassification and arbitrariness.
Particularly, then, in an area of such murkiness and even manipulability,
where misclassifications are common, there is much to be said for a simpler,
two part rule of reasonableness as explicitly'41 specified in Hazelwood, rather
than the more complex three part rule that results if we read a superimposed
viewpoint-neutrality requirement into Hazelwood.'42
We should, of course, seek to reduce not only the sheer number of legal
errors, but also the severity of the errors that legal rules create. How serious
will the errors of misclassification be if we adopt the simpler two-part test
formulation for Hazelwood-type cases and omit any third requirement of
viewpoint-neutrality? Among the realistic such scenarios would be those
involving a regulation that would properly pass the relaxed Hazelwood
standard, but that is misclassified as bearing upon speech in a more protected
designated or limited purpose public forum. Let us assume that the
misclassified regulation is in fact reasonably regulated to a legitimate
pedagogical concern.
If the regulation is then judicially misclassified as applying to a type-2
designated or limited-purpose public forum, and the speech regulation is held
to be either viewpoint-based or even more generally content-based, it will
likely be struck down. 143 The regulation could have been upheld in the context
of any non-public forum, and not merely in the context of a Hazelwood non-
public forum, if it were held to be content- but not viewpoint-based. 1"
ACLU v. Mote, 423 F.3d 438, 444 (4th Cir. 2005); Warren, supra, 196 F.3d at 194 (quoting Perry,
460 U.S. at 48). Deciding who counts as sufficiently similar to current speakers, especially when the
scope and limits of the designated forum have never been fully specified, is at best speculative. At
worst such a process becomes an entry point for arbitrariness, if not viewpoint bias. Relatedly, "a
facially neutral restriction may operate as a facade for excluding speakers expressing certain
viewpoints while allowing those expressing other viewpoints to enter." Make the Road By Walking,
378 F.3d 133, 151 (2d Cir. 2004).
140. See, e.g., Warren, 196 F.3d at 194; Perry, 460 U.S. at 48.
141. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
142. See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
143. See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
144. See supra notes 106-10 and accompanying text. But cf Make the Road By Walking, 378 F.3d at 150
(due to overlap, "the distinction between content discrimination-permissible in a nonpublic
forum-and viewpoint discrimination-impermissible-is somewhat imprecise") (citing
Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831).
Surprising Case for Viewpoint
The crucial problem, though, is that striking down a reasonable regulation
of speech is not necessarily a good thing. A generally sensible speech
regulations being struck down unnecessarily, especially in our Hazelwood
cases, is not necessarily a victory for the public good or even freedom of
speech. Such a misclassification and judicial rejection of the speech regulation
may well be unnecessarily costly in terms of constitutional, educational, and
other public values."'
D. At the Vague Boundaries of Public Forum Doctrine: Regulating School-
Sponsored Speech in Non-Public Fora and the School's Speaking For Itself
The costs in educational or other public values of the above sort of
misclassification may or may not in any given case be modest. But let us
briefly consider as well another vague boundary problem. The law seeks to
distinguish between speech by some party that is apparently or actually
approved by the school from speech by the school itself, made officially on
behalf of the school by an authorized agent of the school.146 At its simplest,
then, the law seeks to distinguish between nonpublic forum speech that the
school merely somehow approves or sponsors, and official speech on behalf
of the school itself by its agents. The distinction between speech in a
nonpublic forum that the school somehow sponsors and speech by or officially
in the name of the school is inevitably vague, if it is tenable at all. We should
145. See infra Section IV and the educational and civic values at stake in Hazelwood nonpublic forum
cases as briefly discussed in Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 272.
146. For a sense of the wide latitude accorded to governments speaking officially in their own right, see,
e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Bd. of Visitors, 515 U.S. 819, 833-34 (1995); Specifically, a
government may not only discuss "gay and lesbian awareness and tolerance in general, but also...
advocate such tolerance if it so decides, and restrict the contrary speech of one of its own
representatives by refusing to incorporate that speech into its own presentation." Wells v. City and
County of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1143 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Downs v. Los Angeles Unified
Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1014 (9th Cir. 2000)); Edwards v. Cal. Univ., 156 F.3d 488, 492 (3d Cir.
1998) ("[a] holding that the University may not discriminate based on viewpoint of private persons
whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the University's own speech, which is controlled by
different principles") (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833-34); Peck, 426 F.3d at 625 n.5 ("[w]hen
the government itself is the sole speaker, it need not ensure viewpoint diversity and can simply
express its own viewpoint") (quoting Make the Road By Walking, 378 F.3d at 151).
Further, a government as speaker is entitled to "take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure that
its message[s] [are] neither garbled nor distorted." Griffin v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 274 F.3d 818,
822 (4th Cir. 2001) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833-34). See also Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d
606, 615 (5th Cir. 2005) ("[b]ecause the Board must necessarily exercise its editorial discretion in
selecting which private entities will convey the message the state selects, forum analysis and
viewpoint neutrality are inapposite in this case").
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therefore be reluctant to try to impose radically different free speech tests on
such only hazily distinguishable categories.
In this context, we begin with the well-settled premise that a public school,
along with other government entities, has great latitude in speaking through its
agents for itself. A school is not subject to anything like a broad prima facie
requirement of viewpoint-neutrality in its speech on its own behalf. We
rightly expect schools speaking in their own name to privilege certain views
and values.'47
It is possible to grant that there is some reason to avoid radically different
free speech tests for difficult-to-distinguish speech contexts, but to still
maintain that speech and its restriction by a school in its own right, along with
merely school-sponsored speech in a nonpublic forum, should both be subject
to a strict viewpoint-neutrality requirement.
But that rule would realistically be a non-starter. Requiring a school to
virtually never choose among messages based on point of view, even when the
school is speaking in its own voice, is at best widely unattractive on the
merits. "48 If a school wishes, for example, to say in its own name that harmony
is better than divisiveness, or that equality is better than caste, it should be
allowed to do so without having to pass strict scrutiny, and without having to
invent sufficient viewpoint-neutral grounds for saying so. If one or more
students prefer to endorse disharmony in their own name, that speech is
instead governed by other rules. 4 9
Requiring a school to treat all viewpoints equally in its own official
speech, as tested by strict scrutiny, would also be unmanageable as a practical
matter, even if we could reliably distinguish such speech from rherely school-
sponsored speech. Deciding judicially whether a school's official speech
reflected a viewpoint-bias, or was instead based on grounds other than
viewpoint and approval or disapproval of the ideas involved, would typically
be difficult. 50
147. See the authorities cited supra note 146.
148. A democratically elected government that affords itself literally no privileged opportunities in
articulating the values on which it was elected is likely to thereby undermine its own leadership, and
seems unlikely to long prevail in any competition among parties or governments.
149. See generally Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969); Bethel Sch.
Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685-86 (1986).
150. See, e.g., Make the Rd. By Walking Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d at 150 (noting the imprecision of the
viewpoint-based versus other content-based or subject matter-based distinction). See also PMG Inter.
Div. v. Rumsfeld, 303 F.3d 1163, 1171 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 831). It
seems clear that one means of attempting to favor or disfavor particular viewpoints can be to prohibit
raising an entire subject from any point of view.
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In fact, asking a public school to educate, but at the same time to not
discriminate in its own official speech on the basis of viewpoint, is actually
deeply incoherent. It is to ask the impossible. To educate in a pluralist
democratic society inevitably requires that the school speak substantively in
its own voice, through policies, rules, curricular choices, assemblies,
textbooks, library holdings, publications, websites, and in other contexts.
Many considerations may affect such choices. But such choices must to a
degree prefer one view over another and not merely as a matter of effect, but
of intent as well. Nor would a policy of official silence on all issues amount
to genuine viewpoint neutrality, even if official silence on, say, competitively
selected textbooks were logically possible.
This is not to suggest that there is no practical difference between, for
instance, a school's endorsing one candidate for mayor and officially
endorsing none. Both decisions are in a sense not neutral; but, their effects on
public perceptions of the school may dramatically differ. There can sometimes
be meaningful value in a teacher's careful disclaimer that she is in a given
instance speaking only personally in a classroom discussion, and not on behalf
of the school.15' A school can also welcome individual or group student
dissent in one or more ways.'52
It is clear that attempting to judicially require viewpoint neutrality in a
school's own official speech, or in the restriction by higher authority of the
school's own other recognized official agents, is not a viable option. If, in
view of the likely confusion, official school speech and merely school-
sponsored speech are to have similar free speech tests, the best option is to
allow for speech regulation on the basis of viewpoint in both contexts, rather
than in neither context.
E. Distinguishing School-Sponsored Speech and the Independent Speech
of Students
An interesting response to this argument takes the problem of category
overlap in a different direction. There may well be serious overlap between
official school speech and merely school sponsored speech. Yet, might not
151. But cf Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066 (11 th Cir. 1991) (classroom teaching at public university
prefaced by references to personal religious bias). The effectiveness of such a disclaimer may always
be open to question, but is at least more likely to be understood by students of greater age and
sophistication.
152. See e.g.. Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (discussing the use of mandatory student
activity fees in a supposedly viewpoint-neutral manner to subsidize and promote a range of
conflicting viewpoints expressed by private organizations).
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there be as much confusion 1 3 between apparently school sponsored speech and
the speech of individual students or groups of students speaking entirely in
their own right, on their own behalf? These latter instances of purely
independent student speech we may generally refer to as Tinker-type cases.'54
Should there be some similar test for both Hazelwood and Tinker-type cases
in light of this possible confusion? Should that common test then allow, in
substance, for viewpoint-based regulation in appropriate cases, even in Tinker-
type cases?
There are two things to say at this point in response. First, there is some
reason to conclude that even if the confusion between school-sponsored speech
and independent student speech is as common as between school-sponsored
and official school speech, the practical problems created by such overlap may
be less in the former case. Both school-sponsored speech and official school
speech will typically involve speech in the name of the school, or a claim to
speak in the name of the school. Anything like a disclaimer, a disavowal, or
a disassociation of school affiliation in that context will often be nearly
impossible or only partly effective. It may often be difficult to clarify in the
public mind the status of the speech as between official school speech and
merely school-sponsored or school-endorsed speech.
Second, if the confusion is between school-sponsored speech and
independent student speech, it will often be possible for either or both parties
to at one point or another substantially limit if not eliminate any reasonable
public confusion. Either party, if it cares to, will often be able to credibly
disavow, or else positively associate itself with, the speech. There may be rare
cases, though, in which disavowal is somehow impossible, or is not available
in time, or is too costly.
Often, though, the school may credibly, clearly, and conspicuously
disavow the speech in question, at least in terms of its sponsorship, without
reaching the merits of any agreement-worthiness of the speech. Such a
disavowal itself should typically resolve any reasonable confusion. In such a
case, the school often need not single-out, let alone disagree with, the speech
in question. Instead, the school's disclaimer of sponsorship can extend to all
153. Such cases could, for example, take the form of a dispute over whether a medium such as a
newspaper, yearbook, website, or bulletin board comprises school-sponsored speech or independent
student speech. See, e.g., Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731,735-36 (7th Cir. 2005) (yearbook); Bannon
v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208 (1 th Cir. 2004) (mural painted as part of school
construction project); Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 346 (6th Cir. 2001) (yearbook as a "limited
public forum").
154. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
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instances of a broad category of speech.'55 Such a disavowal may not always
be neutral in its intent or effect and may even intentionally aim critically at
perceived bias or prejudice;'56 but it should ordinarily establish the lack of
school sponsorship of the speech.
Let us suppose, however, that there is still a reason, based in overlap and
confusion, to apply similar speech tests in the cases of school-sponsored and
independent student speech. To put it another way, that the Hazelwood test
and the Tinker test should for some reason be roughly compatible, at least with
regard to permitting or generally rejecting viewpoint-based regulation of
speech. Should we not understand Tinker, at least, as largely ruling out
viewpoint-based regulation of independent student speech?
It is doubtless tempting to read Tinker as a broad charter for independent
student free speech, at least where the speech is not vulgar or profane.' 7
Tinker does not talk explicitly of permitting viewpoint-based speech
restrictions in appropriate cases. It is certainly possible to express the gist of
Tinker in viewpoint-neutral terms, at least in some formalistic sense.
As Tinker is commonly interpreted, though, the logic of Tinker is open in
appropriate instances to what amount in substance to viewpoint-based speech
restrictions, or to restrictions that take someone's agreement or disagreement
with the message itself into account. Tinker clearly allows for restrictions on
speech to protect largely unspecified rights of largely unspecified persons apart
from the speaker. 5 8 As we recognize or decline to recognize various sorts of
rights jeopardized by Tinker speech, inevitably we thereby advance and impair
the expression of particular associated independent student points of view.
Recognition or non-recognition of new rights will realistically be inseparable
155. The Court in Hazelwood writes that
a school may in its capacity as publisher of a school newspaper or producer of a
school play 'disassociate itself' ... not only from speech that would 'substantially
interfere with its work.., or impinge upon the rights of other students,' . . . but also
from speech that is, for example, ungrammatical, poorly written, inadequately
researched, biased or prejudiced, vulgar or profane, or unsuitable for immature
audiences.
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260,271 (1988) (citations omitted). Note, in particular
the Court's endorsement here of the school's disassociating itself from speech that is thought by the
school to reflect bias or prejudice, a determination that is hardly possible without a viewpoint
evaluation. The disassociation by the school is thus in such a case made on viewpoint-based grounds.
See id.
156. Seeid.
157. See id, and in terms of the direct sanction of student speech, see Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser,
478 U.S. 675, 683-85 (1986). Thus according to Hazelwood, "[a] school need not tolerate student
speech that is inconsistent with its basic educational mission." 484 U.S. at 266 (quoting Fraser, 478
U.S. at 685).
158. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 509, 513.
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from consequences on what then may or may not be said and specifically in
the viewpoints involved. Tinker thus has ample potential for judicially
reflecting what would in practice amount to preference among viewpoints. As
well, Tinker allows for restrictions protecting and furthering the undisputed
and unimpaired educational work and mission of the school itself.159 The
educational mission of the public school is to some degree infused with
viewpoint preferences about cultural values and is arguably adversely affected
by the expression of certain student messages and viewpoints, and not by
others.
These limitations on independent student speech do not refer directly to
a school's explicitly privileging any student-expressed point of view in any
context. There will certainly be occasions in which a school, in restricting
independent student speech under Tinker, is acting directly for the sake of
avoiding substantial interference with its work or for avoiding some rights
violation. The school, however, may well be crucially motivated by its
sympathy or lack of sympathy for viewpoints of the would-be speakers and
their audience.
The independent student speaker's viewpoint, perhaps in some cases one
of hostility toward other groups of students, may in turn be resented or rejected
by other students. 160 The restriction on such speech, however it might be
formally justified, is clearly framed, motivated, and mediated by the cognitive
and emotional reactions of some persons to the perceived merits of the views
expressed by others. The essential educational work and mission of the school
is, as well, ultimately based on official preferences among viewpoints.
Civility, respect, equality, and tolerance, along with the undoubted values of
free speech and dissent, can be legitimate, and indeed, crucial elements of that
public school mission. These are affirmed values not only at the level of
general civic and public educational expectations, but at the level of free
speech doctrine as well.' 6 1
Thus, the role of these crucial values need not be confined to the school's
official speech, or even to the combination of official and school-sponsored
speech. The legitimate unimpaired teaching of values such as basic civic
159. See id See also Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266; Fraser, 478 U.S. at 682, 685; Brandt v. Bd. of Educ.,
420 F. Supp. 2d 921, 930 (N.D. 11. 2006) ("a school need not tolerate student speech that is
inconsistent with the school basic educational mission").
160. See, e.g., Confederate flag in public school cases such as Scott v. Sch. Bd. of Alachua County, 324
F.3d 1246 (11 th Cir. 2003); Castorina v. Madison County Sch. Bd., 246 F.3d 536 (6th Cir. 2001);
Denno v. Sch. Bd. of Volusia County, 218 F.3d 1267 (11 th Cir. 2000); West v. Derby Unified Sch.
Dist., 206 F.3d 1358 (10th Cir. 2000).
161. See Fraser, 478 U.S. at 683-85; Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271-72.
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equality may extend at least to restricting the expression by independent
students of extreme group-based contempt or the direct, personalized advocacy
in school of extreme group subordination. Such speech could easily be held
to impair the basic mission and civic functioning of the school. Tinker itself,
in recognizing the public school's broad legitimate pedagogical mandate,
authorizes no less.
In such cases, a school's inability to appropriately regulate such
independent speech might itself send to many reasonable students and to
outsiders an important unattractive message that the school should be entitled
to not send. If it is still insisted that all such speech regulation is in a sense
still -viewpoint-neutral, the question then reduces to mostly one of mere
terminology. But without substantial disagreements on the merits concerning
the messages or views sent and received, the point of any regulation of the
student speech in these cases largely disappears.
F. Distinguishing Between Viewpoint-Based and Viewpoint-Neutral
Restrictions As a General Problem
A similar problem and a similar logic in another context also suggest
tolerating reasonable viewpoint-based regulation in Hazelwood-type cases.
The distinction, in general, between a viewpoint-based restriction and a
viewpoint-neutral restriction may in the abstract seem clear, but it is often hazy
and contestable. 62 We have already seen that a viewpoint-based restriction in
a type-2 designated or limited-purpose forum can often be characterized as
instead merely clarifying, by exclusion, the defining scope and purposes of the
forum itself.163 More generally, viewpoint-based restrictions can be taken for
subject matter-based or other content-based restrictions, and vice versa."6
In particular, though, we should also consider the costs in basic
educational and other public values of misclassifying a school-sponsored
speech restriction as viewpoint-based when the restriction is actually merely
based on subject-matter, or on other viewpoint-neutral grounds. Such cases
would involve regulation of school-sponsored speech based on some entirely
reasonable viewpoint-neutral grounds, where the regulation might well be able
to "pay for itself' under an appropriate viewpoint-neutral free speech test, but
where the regulation is misclassified and mistakenly struck down under a
162. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
163. See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
164. See, e.g. Make the Rd. By Walking, Inc., 378 F.3d at 151 ("a facially neutral restriction may operate
as a facade for excluding speakers expressing a certain viewpoint").
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demanding strict scrutiny test for viewpoint based-speech restrictions. This
outcome involves an unnecessary and unjustified loss of educational or other
civic value.
Admittedly, it is also possible for a regulation of school-sponsored speech
that is actually based on viewpoint to be misclassified as based on grounds
other than viewpoint, and thus improperly upheld. But the costs in public
values of this opposite kind of mistake may well tend to be relatively low. As
we shall see below,'65 in the context of speech that is school-sponsored,
reasonable and legitimate regulation of speech based on the school's desire to
promote some views and ideas in preference to others will often be justifiable.
There may be instances as well in which viewpoint-based regulations of
school-sponsored speech actually promote no appropriate educational or civic
values. Punishing the editors of a school newspaper precisely for say, failure
to denigrate some ethnic group, would presumably fall into this category. Let
us assume that the courts then have difficulty with the problem of pretext in
such a case, and that they thus misclassify the regulation as viewpoint-neutral.
Again, little harm is done by this misclassification, as our own suggestion is
to indeed allow for the possibility of a viewpoint-based regulation in some
cases, but only as long as the viewpoint-based regulation promotes a genuinely
legitimate pedagogical concern in a reasonably tailored way,'66 allowing as
well for other appropriate causes of action by challenging parties.
This is certainly not to downplay the interests of those persons stigmatized
by a school's invidious regulation of fair-minded school-sponsored speech.
The responses of those stigmatized persons will presumably be protected by
the Tinker free speech standard for individual or groups of students whose
speech is not school-sponsored. More importantly, the victims of invidious
speech regulation by a public school retain a range of possible remedies if the
school's regulation of fair-minded, school-sponsored speech is based on
viewpoint. These will include potential civil rights-oriented remedies.
A school's regulation of such speech, therefore, must always at a
minimum promote a legitimate purpose of a public educational system in a
reasonably tailored way. And an invidious viewpoint-based regulation must
still face the gauntlet of potentially relevant independent statutory judicial tests
apart from free speech, including federal and state civil rights laws,'67 which
may also bear upon the legitimacy or tailoring of the school's regulation.
165. See infra Section IV.
166. See Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273.
167. See, e.g., the discussion of potential federal civil rights violations and a school's resulting anti-
harassment policy in Saxe v. State Coll. Area Dist., 240 F.3d 200 (3d Cir. 2000) (finding the
particular speech code overbroad in an opinion by then-judge Samuel Alito).
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There are also possible challenges under federal and state equal protection
provisions; 168 free exercise of religion 169 or Establishment Clause claims;70 as
well as claims based on state constitutional rights to equality in public
education.' 7 ' Any remaining risks of viewpoint-based regulatory harms must
be balanced against the substantial gains in fully allowing schools to
distinctively promote values such as equality, civility, and tolerance in school-
sponsored speech without having always to pass a rigorous strict scrutiny test.
Nor should schools be deterred from reasonably promoting such values based
on a school's fear that it may not be able in a given case to prove a genuinely
compelling interest and precise narrow tailoring.
The possibility of a speech regulation's being misclassified either as
viewpoint-based, or instead as viewpoint-neutral, is real. Courts actually differ
among themselves as to whether even the regulation in Hazelwood itself
was, 172 or was not,17 based crucially on the subject matter or topic of the
speech at issue.'74 More broadly, courts have inevitably been reduced in a
wide variety of contexts to doing their best, with an eye toward the various
costs of litigation, with the murky viewpoint-based-viewpoint-neutral
distinction.
168. See, e.g., Seidman v. Paradise Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 327 F. Supp. 2d 1098 (D. Ariz. 2004)
(decided in part on equal protection as well as free exercise grounds) (student sought to have religious
reference inscribed on individual wall tile within school); Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F.
Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (school assembly and program speech case decided in part on equal
protection, free exercise, and Establishment Clause grounds).
169. See, e.g., Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) (denying summary judgment on
free speech and free exercise of religion claims in alleged compelled speech case involving acting
classes); C.H. v. Oliva, 195 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 1999) (free exercise and Establishment Clause claims
raised in case of teacher's refusal to allow student to present religious material in class), aff'd in part
and vacated and remanded in part, 226 F.3d 198 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc); Demmon v. Loudoun
County Pub. Sch., 279 F. Supp. 2d 689 (E.D. Va. 2003) (religiously inscribed brick on public school
walkway) (held to state a claim under free speech and under Establishment Clause but not under Free
Exercise Clause).
170. See, e.g., Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch., 293 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. Mich. 2003); Demmon v.
Loudoun County Pub. Sch., 279 F. Supp. 2d 689 (E.D. Va. 2003).
171. For a broad survey of the area, see Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Evolution of Equality in State
Constitutional Law, 34 RUrrGERs L.J. 1013 (2003).
172. See Searcey v. Harris, 888 F.2d 1314, 1324 (11 th Cir. 1989) (Hazelwood as involving a content-based
regulation focused on subject matter and not on viewpoint).
173. See Hansen, 293 F. Supp. 2d at 798-99 (the school principal in Hazelwood as not opposed merely
to particular topics) ("[allthough Hazelwood itself does not specifically mention viewpoint neutrality,
it is implicit in the Court's holding").
174. Note also the curious disagreement in Settle v. Dickson County Sch. Bd., 53 F.3d 152, 155 (6th Cir.
1995) ("[tlhe censorship in ... Hazelwood... involved a school newspaper, a kind of open forum
for students") with id. at 158 n.1 (Batchelder, Jr., concurring) ("I am puzzled by the majority's
characterization of the school newspaper in Hazelwood as 'a kind of open forum for students").
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Thus, for example, a policy of including military recruiters but excluding
peace activists on a school's career day was understandably held to be
viewpoint-based.'75 In contrast, refusing to allow Planned Parenthood to
purchase advertising space in school-sponsored media was held to be
viewpoint-neutral.' 76 Disallowing a home-schooler's use of public library
meeting rooms for teaching basic curricular subjects was also deemed
viewpoint-neutral.' Excluding members of a welfare rights organization
from the waiting rooms of welfare department offices was also held viewpoint-
neutral. 17 8
The distinction between viewpoint-based and viewpoint-neutral criteria is
murky in part because restrictions fraught with antagonism, fear, or resentment
can often be plausibly explained or at least rationalized on viewpoint-neutral
grounds.179 Yet, it is the very possibility of speech restriction based partly on
such antagonism, fear, or resentment that would, according to common sense,
trigger serious and demanding judicial review of the speech restriction in
question.
IV. THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN LEGITIMATE VIEWPOINT-BASED
REGULATIONS OF SCHOOL-SPONSORED SPEECH
All of the arguments raised above, based mainly on one sort or another of
likely category confusion, deserve full consideration and appropriate weight.
But we should ask as well a much more direct question. We should at least
speculate within limits about some general consequences of possible
alternative free speech rules, including our own suggested rule.
Suppose then that a constitutional rule allowed public schools to privilege
certain viewpoints, and to dis-privilege other viewpoints, in school-sponsored
speech. Suppose further that such privileging and dis-privileging were tested
only on some grounds less rigorous than strict scrutiny. Thus, in such school-
sponsored speech cases, the courts could uphold viewpoint-based speech
regulations without the school's persuasively showing in every instance some
175. SeeSearcey, 888 F.2d at 1324-25.
176. See Planned Parenthood v. Clark County Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 829-30 (9th Cir. 1991) (while at
the same time being motivated at least in part by anticipated parental objections on the merits of the
speech).
177. See Goulart v. Meadows, 345 F.3d 239, 257-58 (4th Cir. 2003).
178. See Make the Road By Walking, Inc. v. Turner, 378 F.3d 133, 151 (2d Cir. 2004).
179. See supra notes 176-178 and accompanying text.
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genuinely compelling pedagogical or other government interest. 80 Or,
perhaps, without the school's having to show that such a regulation is actually
necessary and narrowly tailored to achieve whatever pedagogical interest is
sought. 8'
It is admittedly difficult to resist the temptation to assume that in general
viewpoint-based restrictions are the worst sort speech restrictions and must be
severely constitutionally tested. 8 This may well be sensible in the abstract.
However, it is much less appropriate in the specific context of school-
sponsored speech, for reasons we can now briefly further consider.
In the context of school-sponsored speech, we should consider the likely
costs and benefits of more and less rigorous tests for viewpoint-based
restrictions, including the Court's own literal reasonableness test in
Hazelwood.'83 As best we can determine, would strict scrutiny, if not actual
prohibition,"8 of viewpoint discrimination in regulating school-sponsored
speech be optimal? Would it tend on balance to advance, or to inhibit, the
pursuit of our most basic social and constitutional values under our actual
contemporary cultural conditions?
The primary problem with applying strict scrutiny in this context is that
restriction of speech on the basis of viewpoint is a genuine part of, and not
merely difficult to separate from, the legitimate central mission of the public
schools. A public school or school system must widely uphold what it takes
to be valuable and worthy speech at the direct and explicit expense of less
valuable and less worthy speech that arguably reflects upon the school. 85 A
school is properly expected to refuse to endorse, or at least to hold the right to
refuse to endorse, what it takes to be irresponsible speech even as to
180. For merely a few of many instances of standard strict scrutiny formulas in one or more free speech
contexts, see, e.g., Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 761 (1995)
(citing Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983) in the context of
content-based regulation of speech in traditional public fora); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of
New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (quoting Ark. Writers' Project v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987)).
181. See, e.g., the cases cited supra note 180.
182. See, e.g., R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 430 (1992) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("we have
implicitly distinguished between restrictions on expression based on subject-matter and restrictions
based on viewpoint, indicating that the latter are particularly pernicious") (quoted in Turner
Broadcasting Sys. Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 685 (1994) (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)).
183. 484 U.S. at 273 ("reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns").
184. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
185. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271-72 (1988).
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viewpoint. Is6 The public schools in particular are expected to serve broadly as"a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values. ' 187
This understanding of the purpose of public schools is not merely a matter
of Supreme Court endorsement. I8 It is also central to historical conceptions
of the functions of public schools. Consider in particular the widely-respected
twentieth century progressive educational theorist John Dewey. Dewey of
course recognized a variety of roles and functions of the public schools. I8 9
Among these functions, according to Dewey, is a message or information
filtering process that can be neither invariably viewpoint-neutral nor confined
entirely to official school speech, as distinct from merely school-sponsored
speech. 9 '
Dewey thus declares unabashedly, in his leading statement of progressive
educational principles, that "it is the business of the school environment to
eliminate, so far as possible, the unworthy features of the existing environment
from influence upon mental habitudes."' 91 'Unworthiness' can hardly be
confined to a neutrally selected group of mere subjects; viewpoint, and in
particular a negative evaluative viewpoint, inevitably enters crucially into such
judgments.
By way of elaboration, Dewey then argues that in the schools:
Selection aims not only at simplifying but at weeding out what is undesirable.
Every society gets encumbered with what is trivial, with dead wood from the
past, and with what is positively perverse. The school has the duty of
omitting such things from the environment which it supplies and thereby
doing what it can to counteract their influence in the ordinary social
environment. 92
186. See id. at 272.
187. Id. (quoting Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954)).
188. See id.; Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986).
189. See, e.g., JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION 19-20 (Dover ed. 2004) (1916). For a further
elaboration of some of the presumed purposes of primary education, see THOMAS JEFFERSON'S 1818
REPORT FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, REPRINTED IN THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 459-60
(Merrill D. Peterson, ed.) (Library of America. 1984) (including, inter alia, "to improve, by reading,
[the student's] morals and faculties; to understand his duties to his neighbors and country").
190. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
191. DEWEY, supra note 189, at 20. The relationship between Dewey's progressive pedagogy and
restraints upon merely personal, unsponsored student speech as in Tinker is interesting, but beyond
the scope of our current inquiry. For similar sentiments by arguably the leading Enlightenment
theorist, see IMMANUEL KANT, EDUCATION sec. 18, at 20 (A. Churton trans.) (Univ. of Michigan Press
1960) (1803) ("moral training must form a part of education. It is not enough that a man shall be
fitted for any end, but his disposition must be so trained that he shall choose none but good
ends-good ends being those which are necessarily approved by everyone, and which at the same
time be the aim of everyone").
192. DEWEY, supra note 189, at 20.
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Sensibly, Dewey's express focus here is on the "environment '93 that the
school supplies. This 'environment' presumably starts with the school's own
official speech in its own name, 94 but extends at least to school-sponsored
speech, and perhaps even to some unassigned school library materials.'95 A
public school on such a theory has at least a right, if not a duty,96 to not lend
its legitimizing authority to speech touting what the school deems unworthy' 97
or even perverse, 198 whether the school then tolerates analogous merely
personal student speech under Tinker"99 or not.
This legitimate Deweyan2 °° agenda would not properly carry much weight
for our purposes if public schools most typically applied viewpoint regulation
of school-sponsored speech for invidious purposes, or for purposes at odds
with public education in a democracy that aspires to protect the rights and
interests of all. So we might wish to make a rough "background" judgment,
then, as to whether in the typical run of cases, viewpoint-based restrictions on
school-sponsored speech will tend more to undermine than to promote the
public interest, seen as reasonably reflecting the rights and interests of all.
The messages that contemporary public schools will want to sponsor
doubtless vary in their viewpoint. But at least a cursory examination of the
thinking of leading general institutional actors within public school
management and operation is in this respect generally reassuring. The sense
arises that the most typical viewpoint-based restrictions in our contexts need
not provoke conscientious alarm. They certainly need not be unnecessarily
193. Id.
194. See, e.g., the curricular textbook selection cases of Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 615 (5th Cir.
2005); Asociacion de Educ. Privada v. Garcia Padilla, 408 F. Supp. 2d 62 (D. P.R. 2005).
195. See Bd. of Educ., Island Trees Union Free Sch. Dist. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982). In this case, the
Court divided badly. A plurality opinion by Justice Brennan suggested that removing unassigned
books from the school library could not be justified by a narrow, politically partisan intent to deny
access to disfavored ideas, but could be justified if the school's intent was to deny access to materials
deemed pervasively vulgar or otherwise "educationally unsuitable." See id. at 871. One problem
with this distinction is that too many realistic cases, as of Hitler's Mein Kampf, are characterizable
as both politically objectionable at the level of ideas and educationally unsuitable as well.
196. See DEWEY, supra note 189, at 20.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969).
200. See, e.g., for developments in other contexts, Hilary Putnam, A Reconsideration of Deweyan
Democracy, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 1671 (1990); Margaret Jane Radin, A Deweyan Perspective On the
Economic Theory ofDemocracy, 11 CONST. COMMENT. 539 (1995); RICHARD RORTY, OBJECTIVITY,
RELATIVISM, TRUTH 211 (2001) (discussing Dewey).
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impaired by being subjected to strict scrutiny20' as opposed to a reasonableness
and legitimacy standard.2 °2
Consider, for example, the widely publicized stances on some crucial
issues consistently taken by some of the major general institutional players in
the public schools. We focus here on 'crucial' issues for their inherent weight
as evidence, but communities also benefit when schools properly regulate for
the sake of some less than truly compelling interests, with or without precisely
narrow tailoring. Let us start at the federal elective level. At the electoral-
sensitive level of the Federal Secretary of Education, the Secretary has
commendably and very publicly "reacted to reports of harassment of Muslim
and Arab American students by calling on teachers to discuss diversity with
their students. '2 3 In this effort, the Secretary was seconded by the National
Education Association, which devised a set of lesson plans in response.2°
On broader issues of diversity, the National Education Association has
taken a consistent series of important complementary stands. These include
forthright stances on affirmative action, 2°1 on culturally responsive teaching,2 6
and on inclusiveness in the public schools.20 7 More broadly, the National
Education Association has itself noted that another significant institutional
actor, the American Association of Colleges and Universities has several
201. See supra note 180 and accompanying text.
202. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhimeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) ("reasonably related to legitimate
pedagogical concerns"). For an apparently contrary case, see Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of
Educ., 136 F.3d 364 (4th Cir. 1998) (en banc). This case involved an individual teacher's desire to
enter a controversial play into a statewide competition despite some eventual local political
opposition. Our expectations would be that veteran public school teachers should be somewhat less
likely than random students to want to deliver anti-social messages under school auspices. Boring
was actually decided under the Pickering/Connick general public employee speech test, which tends
to work poorly in academic freedom contexts. It is possible, depending on one's understanding of
the claims at issue, that plaintiff Boring could actually have lost her claim under a viewpoint-neutral
test focusing on curricular authority, but her case is in any event strongly sympathetic. See also the
Pickering/Connick test applied in the somewhat similar teacher speech case of Cockrel v. Shelby
County Sch. Dist., 270 F.3d 1036 (6th Cir. 2001).
203. Stop Bullying Now!, Education World, available at http://www.nea.org/lessons/2004/tt0409l3.html
(website of the National Education Association) (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
204. See id.
205. See Statement ofNEA President Reg Weaver in Support ofPromoting Diversity in Schools, available
at http://www.nea.org/newsreleases/2003/nr03033 I.html (supporting affirmative action) (last visited
Jan. 24, 2007).
206. Culturally Responsive Teaching, available at http://www.nea.org/teachexperience/divko408l .html
("[i]n a world of increasing cultural diversity, teachers need strategies for adapting their teaching to
meet the needs of all students") (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
207. Presidents Viewpoint: Are You Ready?, available at
http://www.nea.org/neatoday/0005/presview.html ("we ... take enormous pride in the diversity of
our public schools.., our schools refuse to exclude; we insist on including every child, from the most
gifted to the most challenging") (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
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"studies... showing how diversity can work to benefit student attitudes and
academic development. 2°8
As well, the National Association of Secondary School Principals
(hereinafter "NASSP") has expressed similar sentiments. The NASSP
Statement of Values holds that "[t]he great variety of faces that regularly
appear in our classrooms and hallways brings with it a similarly great variety
of educational aspirations and needs to which our schools and our society must
respond with care, resources, and professional skills."' 09  The NASSP
Statement continues more specifically to the effect that "[s]chools must
unabashedly teach students about key virtues such as honesty, dependability,
trust, responsibility, tolerance, respect, and other commonly held values
important to our society., 210
Of course, inculcating values such as tolerance and respect2' will often be
conducted through the school's own speech, in the sense of the speech of its
own official agents speaking in that very capacity.2 2  But the legitimate
mission of promoting and privileging a range of values will inevitably extend
to speech that at least appears to bear the stamp of approval of the school itself,
and is thus school-sponsored speech within the meaning of Hazelwood.
Similar sentiments have been expressed by other notable institutional
entities directly involved with the public educational process. Thus, for
example, the American Association of University Professors officially
endorsed affirmative action in 1973,23 and in particular reaffirmed its
commitment to the inclusion of women and minorities in university staffing
in 1983 .24 The American Federation of Teachers has long taken public stands
promotive of civil rights within schools215 and in the broader society as well.216
208. Creating the Interactive Diverse Classroom, available at http://www2.nea.org/he/
advo00/advo0002/feature.html (last visited Jan. 24, 2007). A follow-up search for the term 'diversity'
at the Association of American Colleges and Universities website yielded a total of 3,199 records
containing the term (search for 'diversity' at http://www.aacu-edu.org/search/searchresults.cfm) (last
visited Jan. 24, 2007).
209. NASSP Statement of Values, Preamble, available at http://www.principals.org/s-nassp/ (last visited
Jan. 24, 2007).
210. Id. (student development section).
211. See id.
212. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
213. See Affirmative Action Plans, available at http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/AAplans.
htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
214. See id.
215. See AFT-Civil Rights, available at http://www.aft.org/topics/civil-rights/index.htm (last visited Jan.
24, 2007).
216. See id.
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Regulation of much school-sponsored speech is of a sort that may
distinguish among viewpoints, promoting some viewpoints and being critical
of others. It may be that in a few cases, the viewpoint-based regulation of such
speech could predictably pass strict scrutiny. Such speech regulation would
have to reach the demanding level of being genuinely necessary for and
narrowly tailored to the promotion of a genuinely compelling government
interest." 7 There are, however, doubtless many instances of legitimate and
socially useful such speech regulation where the government interest may
arguably not rise to the level of the genuinely compelling, at least in the eyes
of a particular judge, or even more likely where the government cannot show
the tailoring of the speech regulation to be sufficiently precise to pass the
demanding test of narrow tailoring under strict scrutiny.
The prospect of a strict scrutiny test being imposed on a viewpoint-based
speech regulation may well deter mostly quite sensible regulation of school-
sponsored speech. Particularly under such a rigorous test, where the precise
narrowness of tailoring is inevitably subject to judicial second-guessing, there
is likely to be a "chilling effect" '218 not on clearly independent student speech,
but on the school's ability to fully carry out its "basic educational mission." '219
Student speech that is clearly independent will still be governed under
Tinker,220 rather than Hazelwood. Yet, unnecessarily strict scrutiny of sensible
regulation of arguably school-sponsored speech may well discourage typically
useful speech regulation largely because of the increased risks of litigation
under general civil rights statutes. Such statutes prominently include section
217. See supra note 180 and possible examples cited supra note 202.
218. For a brief discussion and application of the idea of a "chilling effect" or improper disincentive on
legitimate speech, see Multimedia Holdings Corp. v. Circuit Court of Florida, 544 U.S. 1301 (2005).
For an example of a loosely analogous disincentive, see Ruth A. Kennedy, Insulating Sexual
Harassment Grievance Procedures From the Chilling Effect of Defamation Litigation, 69 WASH. L.
REv. 235 (1994). For the sheer manipulability of judicial inquiries into the presence or absence of
sufficient narrow tailoring, see, e.g., R. George Wright, The Fourteen Faces of Narrowness: How
Courts Legitimize What They Do, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 167, 183-87, 195-98 (1997).
219. Discussed in the context of regulating student speech in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S.
260, 266 (1988) (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986). See also,
e.g., Porter v. Ascension Parish Sch. Bd., 393 F.3d 608, 615 n. 16 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Hazelwood
484 U.S. at 266); Canady v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 240 F.3d 437, 441 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting
Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 266).
220. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
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1983 actions, 221 with the prospect of reasonable attorney fees for a prevailing
plaintiff.222
To the extent that strict scrutiny in general inhibits sensible viewpoint-
based regulation of at least apparently school-sponsored speech, the school's
own legitimate free speech interests also suffer. Every conscientious speaker
presumably wishes to convey a clear, consistent, undistorted, ungarbled
message. Strict scrutiny for sensible viewpoint-based regulation of school-
sponsored, as opposed to independent, speech impairs the school's ability to
convey worthwhile and benign messages without unnecessary confusion, and
thus impairs the school's own significant free speech interests, typically to the
prejudice of the community as a whole.
V. CONCLUSION
We need take no issue with the broad general rule that viewpoint-based
restrictions of speech are especially suspect.223 But in our public school-
sponsored speech regulation contexts, the balance of interests actually tilts
against a strict scrutiny test, and in favor of a less demanding and more literal
application of the actual language of Hazelwood.224 For the reasons elaborated
above,225 the direct and indirect costs of strict scrutiny and a viewpoint-
neutrality requirement in school-sponsored speech regulation contexts are
likely to be significant. A lower level of judicial scrutiny is, in contrast, likely
to involve more limited social costs, and to bring significant benefits to the
public educational process and to the broader public.
There will doubtless be cases in which unregulated school-sponsored
speech by students or teachers itself really promotes basic progressive values
unequivocally better than would the speech regulations the particular public
school authorities would prefer. But given the general sympathies of many of
the major institutional actors, such cases would seem to be relatively rare
221. Suits in these contexts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against cities, school boards, and individual defendants
acting under color of state law in violating free speech rights are common, as are actions under Title
IX and under state constitutional provisions. See, e.g., Kincaid v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 342, 345 (6th Cir.
2001) (section 1983 action); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. of Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1211 n.2
(11 th Cir. 2004) (various claims including under section 1983); Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (7th
Cir. 2005) (granting qualified immunity defense of defendants sued in their individual capacity).
222. See, e.g., the discussion of section 1988 attorney fee availability in Texas State Teachers Ass'n v.
Garland Ind. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 788 (1989).
223. See supra notes 1, 182 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
225. See supra sections III and IV.
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occurrences. Students or teachers would in any event retain their free speech
rights under Tinker when speaking independently.
In our contexts, a lower level of judicial scrutiny, as we have seen in
Section IV, better promotes social, educational, and cultural values, and even
basic constitutional values including overall freedom of speech itself. To the
extent that the major institutional educational actors and most public schools
generally wish to send messages of tolerance, civility, inclusion, equality, and
responsibility, such messages are blurred, if not entirely garbled, when persons
who at least appear to speak in the school's name contradict those messages.
The school's own freedom of speech is thus impaired by a strict scrutiny test
that unnecessarily hinders the school's efforts to ensure the clarity of its own
voice and the voices of its actual or apparent spokespersons. Independent
speakers who are publicly understood to be independent of the school can
retain their own speech rights under cases such as Tinker.z26 But the school's
own speech is hardly free where a demanding strict scrutiny test, requiring
viewpoint neutrality, discourages the school from presenting a clear and
consistent stand on significant educational and cultural matters.
Every pattern of legal analysis, though, eventually reaches the limits of its
proper application. What are the limits of the Hazelwood analysis? Should the
constitutional tests of regulations of school-sponsored speech in grade schools
also set the standard for advanced graduate programs of major public research
universities? 227 It is difficult to believe that the same test should apply in both
of these contexts, unless what is in some sense the "same" test is by its nature
in application actually fully responsive to the major relevant differences
between public elementary grade schools and research university graduate
seminars.
Whether we should apply any version of Hazelwood, or some other test,228
in various university campus contexts is, under the current law, murky,
disputed, and unresolved. 229 Even if a public university were to see itself as
226. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969).
227. For discussion of arguably appropriate free speech rule differences based on the age or educational
attainment of the students, and the current judicial disarray on such issues, see, e.g., Hosty v. Carter,
412 F.3d 731 (7th Cir. 2005); Axson-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277 (10th Cir. 2004) ( Hazelwood
Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) applicable to appropriate cases of collegiate speech);
Student Government Ass'n v. Bd. of Trustees, 868 F.2d 473, 480 n.6 (1st Cir. 1989) (Hazelwoodas
not applicable to college newspaper).
228. See cases cited supra note 227.
229. See, e.g., Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 617 n.29 (5th Cir. 2005) (survey of the federal appellate
circuits, finding that Hazelwood has been applied to instructional speech in some circuits, whereas
other circuits have applied what is referred to as the Pickering-Connick test instead). Compare, e.g.,
Vanderhurst v. Colo. Mountain College Dist., 208 F.3d 908, 913-14 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying
Hazelwood) with Boring v. Buncombe County Bd. of Educ., 136 F.3d 364, 368-69 (4th Cir. 1998)
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officially embracing some unusually distinct and substantively defined
mission, we would still want to give appropriate scope to the public interest in
free speech by the school's specialized academic experts in various contexts.230
In any event, with respect to genuine Hazelwood-type problems, any
unclear responsibility in cases of actual or apparent school-sponsored speech
can normally be effectively reduced in the context of, say, a controversial
graduate seminar. Whether it is even possible, in the context of a fourth grade
class, for school-sponsorship to be meaningfully and fully disclaimed seems
doubtful. However, where this kind of disclaimer or disassociation can, as at
the university level, often be effective at the deepest level of understanding,
there remains little or no Hazelwood-type problem of blurred responsibility for
apparent school-sponsored speech.
In the graduate seminar context, the professor, or the school
administration, if not both, may be willing to disavow or disassociate from
sponsoring or being sponsored in23' the controversial speech in question.
These disassociations may well be clear, public, conspicuous, unequivocal,
understandable, and entirely convincing to those affected. The school may be
able to point in addition to its employment of other faculty who publicly
disagree with the speaker on the viewpoint at issue.
Typically, university undergraduate and graduate students and others in a
position to meaningfully evaluate a controversial class or seminar, or lecture
presentation on the merits, will also be able to appreciate any public
disassociation of school and speaker that has taken place. More
fundamentally, the more sophisticated audience will likely presume that
research university faculty members, whether in the sciences and technology
or in social sciences, humanities, or professional schools, do not simply
articulate the preexisting and preordained beliefs of the university trustees and
administration. The professor's controversial views can readily enough be
established as the professor's own, and not necessarily those of the school.
Such university cases, however they are best decided, simply do not fit the
paradigm of Hazelwood-type school-sponsored speech.
(en banc) (applying the broader two-part Pickering-Connick threshold-balancing test). The possible
applicability in teacher classroom speech cases of the Supreme Court's modification of the Pickering-
Connick test in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 126 S. Ct. 1951 (2006) has yet to be established. See also Karen
C. Daly, Balancing Act: Teachers' Classroom Speech and the First Amendment, 30 J. L. & EDUC.
1 (2001).
230. See, e.g., AAUP 1940 Statement on Academic Freedom and Tenure, available at
http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/pubsres/policydocs/1940statement.htm (last visited Jan. 24, 2007).
231. See id. See also Laura K. Schulz, Note, A "Disacknowledgement" of Post-Secondary Student Free
Speech: Brown v. Li and the Applicability of Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier to the Post-Secondary Setting,
47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1185 (2003).
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This observation by itself certainly does not exhaust the differences
between elementary school and research university contexts. The free speech
rights of public university research faculty clearly deserve separate
consideration. As merely a start, we may fairly assume that the more clearly
a university faculty member can establish that she speaks on some occasions
for herself or for some group and not necessarily for the university trustees and
administration, the less the justification for the university to impose viewpoint-
based restrictions on such clearly independent speech. At that point, the value
of viewpoint-based speech restrictions under Hazelwood largely runs out.
